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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
An Arms Race in Southeast Asia? 
Changing Arms Dynamics, Regional Security and the 
Role of European Arms Exports 
Southeast Asia is building up arms rapidly. According 
to data published by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in 
the region increased by over five percent on average in 
2015. If we look at the region’s arms dynamics over 
ten years, it becomes even clearer why the possibility 
of an “arms race” in this part of the Asian continent 
increasingly occupies political, scientific and media 
attention: over the past decade (2006–2015), military 
expenditure in Southeast Asia has risen by 57 percent 
on average. 
In absolute terms (in constant 2014 US dollars), 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia more than doubled 
their spending on the military between 2005 and 
2015. In countries such as Thailand and the Philip-
pines, military expenditure also rose sharply. Arms 
imports by individual Southeast Asian states show a 
similar picture. For the period 2011–2016, Vietnam 
was even in the top ten of the world’s biggest arms 
importers (in eighth place, with a total volume of 
US$ 4.1 billion). Compared to the period 2006–2011, 
Vietnam’s arms imports increased almost sevenfold. 
Thailand’s arms imports more than quintupled be-
tween the five-year periods 2006–2011 and 2011–2016, 
while Indonesia’s doubled. 
The primacy given to military matters and the asso-
ciated change in the arms dynamic suggests that the 
phase of relative stability and security in the region, 
which has lasted since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese 
War in 1979 and been termed ‘ASEAN’s long peace’, is 
coming to an end. Further indicators are the persis-
tence of territorial conflicts between many of the 
region’s states; increasing nationalism; distrust of the 
neighbouring states’ strategic intentions; and the 
growing rivalry between China and the US. One of the 
most common reactions by almost all Southeast Asian 
states to these developments is to build up their mili-
tary capacities. It is precisely this reflex, however, that 
is often perceived by the other states as a potential 
security threat, regardless of the ‘real’ intentions. The 
security dilemma thus created could lead to an arms 
race that would massively destabilise the region as 
growing tensions between increasingly well-armed 
states can have consequences that are difficult to calcu-
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6 
late, for instance in the South China Sea with its many 
conflicts. This would also have a direct impact on 
Europe since a majority of its trade with Asia – which 
is crucial for the world economy – uses shipping lanes 
in these waters. 
Against this backdrop, the study will begin by ad-
dressing whether Southeast Asia is in fact currently 
experiencing an arms race. Its second part will analyse 
the consequences of the changing arms dynamic on 
regional stability by giving an overview of military 
spending in eight Southeast Asian states: Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Vietnam. The case selection is in-
tended to ensure that the study’s empirical findings 
mirror the region’s heterogeneity and enhance the 
representativeness of the findings. The countries 
under study thus represent Indochina and maritime 
Southeast Asia; democracies and autocracies; highly 
and less highly developed economic systems; and 
actors who are either engaged in territorial conflicts 
with China or not. 
China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the 
Pacific is frequently cited as the trigger for the leap 
in arms purchases in Southeast Asia. In particular, 
observers point to China laying claim to large areas of 
the South China Sea and to growing doubts over the 
US’s commitment in case of conflict as having set off 
Southeast Asia’s shopping spree for arms. As the study 
will show, however, in almost all cases other domestic 
and foreign-policy factors besides the ‘China factor’ 
have also been decisive for the rise in military spend-
ing: lasting territorial conflicts between Southeast 
Asian states; internal revolutionary movements; and 
the powerful political influence of the military in 
nearly all the examined nations. Furthermore, the 
study will demonstrate that the changed arms dynam-
ics cannot be interpreted as a classical arms race since 
they have neither taken the shape of a competitive 
pattern of action/reaction nor significantly altered the 
military balance of power in the region. However, the 
arms build-up in Southeast Asia is not merely a moder-
nisation of outdated arsenals to safeguard the status 
quo either. Almost all of the eight states under study 
have built up their military capacities, especially for 
their navies and air forces. This armament has not 
brought them conventional military superiority but 
(frequently asymmetrical) military capacities intended 
to curtail the freedom of movement and strategic op-
tions of perceived enemies. 
Even if no direct link can be shown to exist between 
an arms race and an increasing likelihood of the 
outbreak of violent conflict, this does not mean that 
the region of Southeast Asia is gaining in stability 
through the current arms build-up. On the contrary, 
the changing arms dynamics have contributed, first, 
to a rise in threat perceptions and distrust of the re-
spective neighbour’s ‘real’ intentions. Second, these 
suspicions are further stoked by the lack of transpar-
ency in armament policy, since there are no binding 
regional agreements on arms control, and inter-
national arms control treaties are regularly circum-
vented. Third, in the context of expanded military 
capacities in the region, national security forces are 
increasingly involved in clashes with each other. 
Against this backdrop, Germany and many of its Euro-
pean neighbours would be well-advised to rethink 
both their role as arms suppliers to Southeast Asia and 
their general outlook on the region much more strate-
gically. After all, many of the armaments bought by 
Southeast Asian states in recent years were manufac-
tured in Europe. As a consequence, Germany and 
some of its European neighbours have a direct stake in 
the region’s armament. For the time being, however, 
they continue to view the arms trade with Southeast 
Asian buyers primarily from an economic perspective. 
This, and a simultaneous lack of a political or strategic 
discourse on the consequences of such arms exports, is 
especially surprising in the case of arms exports to the 
littoral states of the South China Sea. After all, parts of 
Southeast Asia, and in particular the South China Sea, 
are recognised by Europe as being conflict zones and 
geopolitical hotspots. 
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Arms Dynamics in Southeast Asia: An Overview 
 
Given the rapid rise of arms purchases in Southeast 
Asia, journalists in particular often refer to an “arms 
race” in the region. Under the definition proposed by 
Colin S. Gray, an arms race takes place if two or more 
hostile parties quickly increase or improve their weap-
onry and orientate their respective defence policies on 
the past, present or anticipated military and political 
behaviour of their opponent.1 According to Gray, four 
elements characterise an arms race: 
1. an antagonism between two or more parties who 
are aware of this enmity; 
2. a tendency of these parties to structure their respec-
tive armed forces in a way that makes them effec-
tive in confrontations with the opponent or deters 
the opponent from initiating a conflict; 
3. a qualitative and/or quantitative military rivalry 
triggered by this, which  
4. goes hand in hand with a rapid quantitative expan-
sion and/or qualitative improvement of military 
capacities.2 
In other words, an arms race is a cycle of action and 
reaction, in which country A rearms, prompting coun-
try B into following suit. This sets off a spiral of arms 
build-ups from which the two opponents feel they 
cannot escape without endangering their respective 
national security. Their goal at all times is to change 
the military balance to their own benefit.  
However, a rapid rise in military expenditure is not 
in itself an indicator of an arms race. Rather, a coun-
try’s arms dynamic evolves in a continuum of arms 
race, arms rivalry, maintenance of the status quo or 
modernisation, and disarmament.3 As a consequence, 
rising military spending can also, for example, indi-
cate that existing weapons systems are being modern-
 
1 Colin S. Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon”, World Politics 
24, no. 1 (1971): 39–79 (40), http://www.cambridge.org/core/ 
services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/ 
B780FDD0C24BCD543FC27129DB6ACC93/S004388710000151
9a.pdf/div-class-title-the-arms-race-phenomenon-div.pdf 
(accessed 12 January 2017). 
2 Ibid., 41. 
3 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World 
Politics (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 
80. 
ised. A change in a country’s arms dynamic does not 
necessarily lead to an uncontrolled arms race. 
What are the reasons behind a step change in the 
arms dynamic? Generally, we can differentiate be-
tween domestic and foreign-policy factors. Examples 
of domestic factors are the availability of resources for 
the defence sector, which are closely tied to the coun-
try’s economic development and the level of state rev-
enues; and the internal security situation and influ-
ence of the armed forces on the nation’s political and 
financial decision-making processes. External factors 
include the country’s regional geostrategic position in 
the context of the (changing) political, financial and 
military role of external actors; a policy of maintain-
ing or increasing one’s national and military prestige 
and status compared to other states; and the existence 
of inter-state conflicts.4 
In the context of the Southeast Asian arms build-up, 
we also need to differentiate roughly between develop-
ments before and after the Asian crisis. The Asian cri-
sis of 1997–1998, which initially manifested itself as a 
crisis in the region’s economic, currency and financial 
systems, had an enormous impact on the politics, 
societies and defence sectors of Southeast Asian coun-
tries. The economies of countries such as Indonesia 
collapsed almost entirely, leading to radical budget 
cuts, including in defence. In previous years, an eco-
nomic boom lasting for many years had enabled the 
so-called Asian ‘Tiger states’ to purchase extensive new 
weapons systems. As a result, between 1988 and 1997 
the military spending of the ASEAN states5 had grown 
on average by 71 percent, far above the world average 
of 31 percent. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore even 
doubled their military budgets in this period. More 
importantly still, the arms purchases effected by the 
countries in this phase reveal a change in procure-
ment. Military doctrines, which had previously been 
directed almost exclusively at defending the country 
 
4 Tim Huxley, “South-East Asia’s Arms Race: Some Notes on 
Recent Developments”, Arms Control 11, no. 1 (1990): 69–76. 
5 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
founded in 1967, is a regional organisation of Southeast 
Asian states. It has ten members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia. 
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Table 1  
Military spending 2005–2015 (in millions of US dollars and using constant 2014 prices) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cambodia  123  124  119  99,5  169  202  213  232  252  278*  n.a. 
Indonesia 3,179 3,228 3,882 3,621 3,784 4,444 5,095 5,850 7,865 6,929 8,071 
Malaysia 4,549 4,451 4,970 5,082  4,798 4,191 4,697 4,480 4,881 4,919  5,300 
Myanmar  716  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,969# 3,169# 3,276#  3,187# 
Philippines 2,507 2,592 2,839 2,840  2,731 2,869 2,916 2,957 3,362 3,103  3,893* 
Singapore 9,278 9,356 9,718 9,794 10,120 9,928 9,574 9,355 9,323 9,668 10,213 
Thailand 3,161 3,502 4,502 5,223  5,826 5,390 5,551 5,472 5,688 5,730  6,101 
Vietnam 1,845 2,172 2,800 2,759  3,030 3,378 3,154 3,672# 3,840# 4,256#  4,581# 
n.a. = no data available, * = estimated, # = very uncertain data  
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988–2015”, SIPRI (online), http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (accessed 5 May 2017). 
 
against internal enemies (counter-insurgency), now 
increasingly focused on conventional national de-
fence.6 As a result, there were extensive and often very 
expensive modernisation programmes for armed 
services branches which had previously been relatively 
neglected, such as the air force and navy.  
After the onset of the Asian crisis, many of the re-
gion’s states were forced to cut their defence budgets, 
some radically. Indonesia’s military budget, for exam-
ple, was more than halved between 1997 and 1999. 
However, this drastic reduction in Southeast Asia’s 
military spending and arms purchases was short-lived. 
At the start of the 21st century, defence budgets and 
defence spending already approached the high growth 
rates before the Asia crisis again.7 They even far ex-
ceeded them in subsequent years in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, for example.  
In the past decade (2006–2015), military spending 
in Southeast Asia grew by 57 percent. For comparison, 
in the same period Europe’s expenditure only rose by 
5.4 percent. In China, however, growth in that decade 
was 132 percent. The increases in the region’s defence 
budgets are particularly impressive in absolute terms. 
Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam more than doubled 
their budgets between 2005 and 2015 (see Table 1). 
Thailand also greatly increased its military spending 
during the same period. Over the past two years, they 
 
6 Bilveer Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms Proliferation 
in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and Internation-
al Studies, 1995), 26; Andrew T. H. Tan, The Arms Race in Asia: 
Trends, Causes and Implications (London: Routledge, 2013), 70. 
7 Tan, The Arms Race in Asia (see note 6), 84; Richard A. 
Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast 
Asian Military Acquisitions”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, 
no. 1 (2010): 50–69. 
have risen further: in Indonesia, military spending 
grew by 16 percent between 2014 and 2016, in Viet-
nam by 7.6 percent, and in the Philippines by 25 per-
cent.8 Between 2011 and 2013, Indonesia saw the big-
gest rise in Southeast and East Asia (over 20 percent).9 
However, the growth rates of individual Southeast 
Asian states show substantial variations. Singapore 
and Malaysia, for instance, had much more modest 
increases in absolute terms:10 for example, whilst 
Singapore’s arms and defence spending only rose by 
9 percent during the decade, in Indonesia the figure 
was 150 percent.11 
The arms imports of individual Southeast Asian 
states present a similar picture (see Table 2). Between 
2011 and 2015, Vietnam was even in the top ten of the 
world’s biggest arms importers (ranked eighth, with 
an import volume of $4.1 billion). Compared to the 
years 2006–2011, Vietnam’s arms imports increased by 
almost exactly 700 percent. Thailand’s arms imports 
grew by 579 percent from the five-year period 2006–
2011 to 2011–2015, Indonesia’s by 101 percent. In 
Myanmar, the figure was 284 percent. However, as 
with military spending there are regional differences 
in arms imports as well: Singapore, which had been 
 
8 Sam Perlo-Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 
2015, SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2016), 3. 
9 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The 
Military Balance 2013 (London, 2013), 248, http://www.iiss.org/ 
en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-
balance-2013-2003 (accessed 12 January 2017). 
10 All data taken from “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
1988–2015”, SIPRI (online), http://www.sipri.org/databases/ 
milex (accessed 5 May 2017). 
11 Perlo-Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 
2015 (see note 8), 3. 
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Table 2 
Arms imports (total volume, in millions of US dollars and at constant 1990 prices) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cambodia  0  14  56  0  4  34  0  77  67  0  0 
Indonesia  36  65  587  244  441  225  250  218  802  1124  441 
Malaysia  59  408  526  508 1,512  421  5  47  71  73  117 
Myanmar  160  175  138  93  52  68  667  398  251  101  245 
Philippines  12  23  16  10  0  0  60  6  55  12  46 
Singapore  542  73  358 1,116 1,485 1,018  940  839  791  666  147 
Thailand  70  47  8  13  64  49  267  285  378  105  166 
Vietnam  214  41  8  172  61  152  1023  733  362  1139  842 
0 = value under  $0.5 million. 
Source: “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database”, SIPRI (online), http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed 5 May 2017). 
 
among the ten biggest arms importers in the world 
for the period 2006-2011, reduced its arms imports by 
18 percent in the subsequent period (2011–2015), 
dropping to thirteenth place.12 
Furthermore, existing data show that military 
spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
fluctuated only slightly in many Southeast Asian 
states in the decade from 2005 to 2015 (see Table 3, p. 
10). It increased in Cambodia (2005: 1.1 percent, 2015: 
1.7 percent), Thailand (2005: 1.1 percent, 2015: 1.6 per-
cent), Myanmar (2005: 1.6 percent, 2015: 3.9 percent) 
and Vietnam (2005: 1.8 percent, 2015: 2.3 percent). In 
Indonesia (2005: 0.8 percent, 2015: 0.9 percent) and 
the Philippines (2005: 1.3 percent, 2015: 1.3 percent), 
military spending as a share of GDP barely grew, or 
stagnated. In Malaysia and Singapore, by contrast, its 
share dropped from 2.2 percent (2005) to 1.5 percent 
(2015) and from 4.3 percent (2005) to 3.2 percent (2015) 
of GDP, respectively. With the exception of Singapore 
and Myanmar, these figures are markedly lower than 
for the US (2015: 3.3 percent), Russia (2015: 5.4 per-
cent) and many states in the Middle East and Africa.13 
To enable a more detailed interpretation of the re-
spective macro-data, the following sections will exam-
ine not only the quantitative aspects of arms spending 
in the individual countries, but also the extent to 
which they have engaged in substantial conventional 
arms transfers in recent years and if so, of what kind 
 
12 Siemon T. Wezeman et al., “Developments in Arms Trans-
fers, 2015”, in SIPRI Yearbook Online, 
http://www.sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198787280/sipri-
9780198787280-chapter-015-div1-094.xml# (accessed 12 
January 2017). 
13 All data taken from “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
1988–2015” (see note 10). 
(subdivided into army, navy and air force). This will 
also include any merchandise already ordered (where 
known) intended to modernise existing weapons sys-
tems or acquire new ones. 
Indonesia 
In 2015 Indonesia spent more than $8 billion on its 
armed forces. Since 2005 Jakarta has thus nearly tripled 
its military expenditure in absolute terms. Its 2015 
military spending represents 0.9 percent of GDP, a very 
slight rise on the 2005 figure (0.8 percent). Because of 
a threat perception that located security risks primari-
ly inside the country, Indonesia had strongly neglected 
its navy and air force for decades. However, faced with 
new external security challenges – such as trans-
national terrorism, piracy, illegal fishing and increas-
ing confrontations with China over fishing rights in 
the South China Sea – Jakarta has had a rethink. Its 
military is now strategically increasingly tilted towards 
protecting national borders (and especially controlling 
Indonesia’s territorial waters).14 The government has 
also initiated extensive military modernisation pro-
grammes. For example, in February 2014 the Indone-
sian military announced plans to extend its military 
base on the Natuna Islands. In recent years, there have 
been several incidents between the Indonesian and 
Chinese coast guards near this group of islands in the 
South China Sea, whose Exclusive Economic Zones 
 
14 Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, Defence 
White Paper 2015 (Jakarta, 2016), http://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENCE-WHITE-
PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf (accessed 17.01.2017). 
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Table 3 
Military spending as share of GDP (in %) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cambodia 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7* n.a. 
Indonesia 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Malaysia 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Myanmar 1.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.6# 4.7# 4.3# 3.9# 
Philippines 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3* 
Singapore 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 
Thailand 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Vietnam 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.2# 2.2# 2.3# 2.3# 
n.a. = no data available, * = estimated, # = very uncertain data  
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988–2015”, SIPRI (online), <www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (accessed 5 May 2017). 
Table 4 
Personnel levels and weapons systems  
Country Number of 
soldiers 
Light and 
heavy tanks 
Artillery 
pieces 
Fighter 
planes  
Battleships Sub-
marines 
Cambodia 124,300  220+  433+  5  16 0 
Indonesia 395,500  390  1,110+  104  110 2 
Malaysia 109,000  69  424  67  51 2 
Myanmar 406,000  290+  419+  167  117 0 
Philippines 125,000  7  254+  22  69 0 
Singapore  72,500  446  798+  126  45 4 
Thailand 360,850  487  2,622  150  111 0 
Vietnam 482,000  1,890  3,040+  101  86 6 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2016 (London, 2016). 
 
(EEZ) lie in areas claimed by China. In the nearby 
future, the base is to host more marines, a squadron of 
Sukhoi fighter planes and four Apache attack heli-
copters.15 
Under the heading of Minimum Effective Force 
(MEF), Indonesia’s Strategic Defence Plan, published in 
2010, lists a series of goals to be realised by 2024. These 
include extensively modernising its air force; develop-
ing a “green-water navy”16; expanding its motorised 
army units; and strengthening the national arms 
industry. As well as modernising existing equipment 
 
15 Felix Heiduk and Michael Paul, “Seas of Trouble: Enduring 
Territorial Conflicts in East and Southeast Asia”, SWP Com-
ments 2015/C 10 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
February 2015), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ 
territorial-conflicts-in-east-and-southeast-asia/ (accessed 12 
January 2017). 
16 For Jakarta, a green-water navy is defined as a navy able to 
control the country’s territorial waters and maritime EEZ. 
and weapons systems, establishing the MEF will en-
compass the provision of ten new fighter jet squad-
rons, 274 naval vessels (Indonesia currently has 213, of 
which half are categorised as unseaworthy),17 twelve 
submarines (currently two) and dozens of new tanks, 
helicopters, artillery systems and transport vehicles.18 
The MEF objectives look highly ambitious, especially 
considering that the modernisation of Indonesia’s 
marine and air force has to start from very low levels. 
To reach the initial targets of the MEF, Indonesia’s 
defence spending as a share of GDP needed to nearly 
double – from about 0.8 percent in 2010 to 1.5 percent 
 
17 James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: 
A Comparative Study (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 85. 
18 “The Indonesian Armed Forces – Modernisation Under-
way”, Asian Defence Journal, (November 2014): 10–15. 
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in 2016.19 That has not happened. Hence changes in its 
arms dynamics have only partially materialised in some 
sections of the armed forces. A closer look at the mili-
tary equipment already purchased also reveals that 
these purchases will more likely serve to (partially) 
modernise outdated equipment, rather than to mean-
ingfully build up the country’s military capabilities. 
In the past few years, Jakarta has obtained over 
100 Leopard fighter jets (61 of type II A4 and 42 of type 
II A5) for its armed forces from Germany. In 2014 
France delivered 37 CAESAR 155mm howitzers as well 
as 136 Mistral ground-to-air missiles. From the United 
Kingdom, Indonesia acquired 500 Starstreak ground-
to-air missiles; from Ukraine, five armoured personnel 
carriers; from Brazil, 36 rocket launchers; and from 
the US, inter alia, more than 300 anti-tank missiles.20 
Its air force has been expanded by eight Apache attack 
helicopters, several cargo planes and anti-submarine-
sonar devices from the US. In May 2016 the Indonesian 
government also signed a contract for eight Sukhoi 
Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. According to observers, 
this purchase is primarily linked to the long-lasting 
problems Indonesia has had with maintaining its 
existing squadrons of twelve American F-16 jets and 
five F-5s. These technical difficulties are a consequence 
of a military embargo, imposed by the US in 1999 after 
the massacre in East Timor carried out by Indonesian 
militia, that was not lifted until 2005.21 The Sukhois 
are therefore principally intended to replace the out-
dated F-5s from 2017 onwards. The Indonesian air 
force is also a partner in the KF-X Fighter Jet Initiative, 
established by the US arms manufacturer Lockheed 
and the South Korean government to develop and 
manufacture a South Korean fighter jet. The first pro-
totype is expected in 2020.22 Indonesia plans to 
 
19 “President Promises to Allocate Rp210 Trillion as Military 
Budget”, Antara News (online), 13 May 2015, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/98921/president-
promises-to-allocate-rp210-trillion-as-military-budget 
(accessed 12 January 2017). 
20 All data taken from “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
1988–2015” (see note 10). 
21 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Indonesia and Russia to Ink Deal for 8 
Su-35 Fighter Jets in May”, The Diplomat (online), 5 May 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indonesia-and-russia-to-ink-
deal-for-8-su-35-fighter-jets-in-may/ (accessed 12 January 2017). 
22 “Indonesia, South Korea Sign $1.3bn KF-X/IF-X Fighter Jet 
Development Deal”, Antara News (online), 7 January 2016, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/102383/indonesia-south-
korea-sign-13bn-kf-xif-x-fighter-jet-development-deal (accessed 
12 January 2017). 
acquire up to 80 fighter jets from the programme.23 In 
2017 Jakarta also intends to obtain from France the 
hardware for eleven French Panther helicopters, to 
be assembled in Indonesia. In spring 2016, it became 
known that Jakarta had plans to acquire 36 AIM-120C-7 
medium-range air-to-air missiles from the US (cost: 
$95 million). The decision is yet to be finalised.24 
Given its extremely small and badly equipped navy 
(relative to the length of Indonesia’s coastline), the 
government has focused on buying submarines. By 
2024 it plans to bulk out its navy to twelve sub-
marines.25 In 2012 the government bought three type 
209 South Korean submarines, one of which is ex-
pected to be manufactured in Indonesia. In May 2016 
it became public knowledge that Jakarta also intends 
to buy two Kilo-class submarines and several Beriev 
amphibian flying boats from Russia. The Indonesian 
navy currently only has two submarines acquired in 
the 1970s at its disposal, which are to be replaced in 
2020 by the new purchases described above.26 Jakarta 
has already ordered two new frigates from the Nether-
lands and, to equip them, anti-ship missiles from 
China (100 of type C-802) and France (30 MM-40 Exo-
cets). Moreover, in late 2014 the government grouped 
together the coast guard – which had previously con-
sisted of several individual agencies, each with differ-
ent competences and each assigned to a different 
ministry – into a single institution. 
Even once all the above-listed orders are delivered, 
however, the targets for battleships and fighter jets set 
out in the Minimum Essential Force of the Strategic 
Defence Plan will be not be met – in some cases not at 
all. The navy will not achieve the striking force of 110 
ships, deemed necessary by the Plan, nor will the air 
force reach 180 fighter jets, divided into ten squad-
rons. What is more, a large proportion of the existing 
vessels and planes is so aged that chronic maintenance 
faults frequently make them unusable. To replace this 
armoury, Jakarta would have to make extensive pur-
chases of new ships and planes in the years ahead. The 
budgeted additional expenditure for the defence sector 
 
23 Gady, “Indonesia and Russia to Ink Deal” (see note 21). 
24 “AMRAAMs for Indonesia“, Asian Defence Journal, April 
2016, p. 72. 
25 IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge, 2016), 
213. 
26 Gabriel Dominguez, “Indonesia Considering Purchase of 
Russian Kilo-class Submarines, Says Ambassador”, IHS Jane’s 
360, 1 June 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/60877/ 
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over the next ten years was meant to be covered by 
annual economic growth of 7 percent or more. In 
2014, however, this growth forecast already had to be 
revised downwards. In view of the flagging economy 
and the pressing problems in social, health and educa-
tion policy, it seems unlikely that President Jokowi 
will drastically raise military spending in the coming 
years. Besides, almost two thirds of its defence budget 
continues to be spent on personnel costs and over-
hauling existing military equipment. This means that 
the acquisition of new modern (and thus often very 
costly) weapons systems, which in turn was presented 
as a key feature in the Strategic Defence Plan, appears 
unlikely. Observers therefore expect a piecemeal, non-
systematic renewal of several military sectors that will 
not actually meet the targets that have been set out in 
the Minimum Essential Force.27 Accordingly, Indone-
sia’s current arms policy should not be interpreted as 
an expansive arms build-up. By regional standards, its 
new acquisitions remain meagre as a share of GDP and 
essentially concern the modernisation of armed ser-
vices branches that had been neglected for years. In 
terms of the navy, for example, Indonesia primarily 
wants to improve its ability to control its own terri-
torial waters and EEZ. Even if it achieved the MEF, 
Jakarta would still not pose a credible potential mili-
tary threat to its neighbours.28 
Cambodia 
In 2014 Phnom Penh spent $278 million on its armed 
forces, more than doubling its defence budget since 
2005 in absolute terms. The 2014 military expenditure 
represents 1.8 percent of GDP, a substantial increase 
compared to 2005 (1.1 percent of GDP). According to 
media reports, the Cambodian National Assembly 
adopted a defence budget of $383 million for 2016, 
which would correspond to 9 percent of the national 
budget and an increase of 17 percent compared to the 
 
27 Benjamin Schreer, Moving beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s 
Military Modernisation (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, November 2013), http://www.aspi.org.au/ 
publications/moving-beyond-ambitions-indonesias-military-
modernisation (accessed 12 January 2017). 
28 Felix Heiduk, “Indonesiens Sicherheitspolitik: Die Suche 
nach strategischer Autonomie”, in Sicherheit in Asien: Konflikt, 
Konkurrenz, Kooperation, ed. Hanns Günther Hilpert and 
Christian Wagner, IPS, vol. 67 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft, 2016), 169–97. 
2014 defence budget.29 Whilst there is no detailed list-
ing of the individual items of the 2016 defence bud-
get, observers assume that two-thirds of Cambodia’s 
military spending will continue to go on personnel 
costs and that new arms purchases will therefore not 
rapidly increase the army’s military capacities in 
future either.30 The country’s defence policy continues 
to focus on securing the regime and protecting the 
nation’s borders. The majority of military spending 
has been on the army. With its very poorly developed 
infrastructure, Cambodia faces essential challenges for 
its armed forces, especially in the shape of mobility 
deficits. In recent years, its military procurement has 
therefore centred on buying transport vehicles.  
For its army, the Cambodian government has 
bought four used, Soviet-made fully amphibian 
BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance tanks and 40 used 
BTR-60PB armoured infantry carriers, all from Bul-
garia. It also acquired 20 RM-70 122 mm mobile rocket 
launchers und 61 BMP-1 armoured infantry vehicles 
from Czech stocks. Moreover, it bought a further eight 
armoured infantry vehicles and five mobile rocket 
launchers of the same type, also used, from Slovakia 
and a further 40 type BTR-60PB armoured infantry 
vehicles from Ukraine. In recent years, Cambodia has 
also purchased 60 T-55 battle tanks from Serbia and, 
from Ukraine, a further 100 tanks of the same type, 
all second-hand.  
The Cambodian air force has been expanded by the 
addition of two MA60 cargo planes of Chinese produc-
tion and twelve Harbin-Z-9 helicopters, also manufac-
tured in China. The helicopter purchase was financed 
using a credit of $195 million, granted by China as 
part of its military aid. According to statements by the 
Cambodian defence ministry, its air space is mainly 
secured using ground-to-air rocket launchers fired 
from the shoulder, equally made in China. It also 
intends to acquire long-range ground-to-air missiles in 
future. However, no specific schedule has been made 
public.31 
 
29 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Cambodia Boosts Defense 
Budget for 2016”, The Diplomat (online), 3 December 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/cambodia-boosts-defense-
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30 Jon Grevatt, “Cambodia Announces 17% Increase in 2016 
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Whilst Cambodia’s 2006 Defence White Paper 
places much more emphasis than previous documents 
on the need to better secure its sea borders, the gov-
ernment has not made any significant armament 
purchases for its navy in the period covered by this 
study. The Cambodian navy continues to consist only 
of a few badly maintained patrol boats.32 In other 
words, during the period examined, Cambodia’s arms 
spending has certainly increased significantly. How-
ever, this has not substantially changed its armed 
forces’ conventional weapons systems or military 
threat potential, since the majority of the additional 
expenditure has gone on personnel costs and modern-
ising outdated armoury. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia’s 2015 defence budget was $5.3 billion. Since 
2005 Kuala Lumpur has thus increased its military 
spending by about 15 percent in absolute terms. Its 
2015 military expenditure represents 1.5 percent of 
GDP and has thus markedly dropped since 2005 
(2.2 percent of GDP). Two external threats to its secu-
rity in 2013 and 2014 revealed gaps in the armed 
forces’ capacities, triggering a domestic discussion 
about the need to modernise or expand, especially the 
air force and navy. In 2013 a militant group from the 
southern Philippines entered the Malaysian federal 
state of Sabah, which covers the northern part of the 
island of Borneo. The few badly equipped Malaysian 
forces stationed in Sabah were unable to repel this 
‘invasion’ for some time. Like Vietnam and the 
Philippines, Malaysia is also in conflict with China 
over who has sovereignty over a number of reefs and 
islands, as well as the delimitation of its EEZs in the 
South China Sea.33 Since 2013 Chinese fishing and 
coast-guard vessels have repeatedly entered waters 
claimed by Malaysia. China held a manoeuvre at sea 
near the James Shoal, which Malaysia also considers 
part of its territory. These intrusions were forcefully 
condemned by the Malaysian defence minister, and 
led to calls for the defence budget to be raised and 
for the navy and air force in particular to be modern-
 
32 Goldrick and McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia (see note 
17), 59. 
33 Prashanth Parameswaran, Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Ap-
proach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States, 
Maritime Strategy Series 6 (Washington, D.C.: Center for a 
New American Security, February 2015). 
ised.34 The March 2014 disappearance without a trace 
of flight MH370, operated by the national airline 
Malaysia Airlines, also revealed gaps in Malaysia’s 
aerial surveillance. 
In recent years, calls for the navy and air force in 
particular to be upgraded have been heard, at least in 
part. Kuala Lumpur has acquired over 130 armoured 
infantry vehicles from Turkey, to be delivered by 2018. 
The associated gun turrets have been ordered from 
South Africa. The Malaysian government also ordered 
20 armoured infantry vehicles from Thailand, which 
it should receive throughout 2017. From France it 
bought eight large-calibre mortars; from South Africa, 
inter alia, more than 200 new Ingwe anti-tank missiles; 
and in the UK Starstreak ground-to-air missiles. In 
spring 2016 the US also ceded 24 M109 A5 tank howit-
zers under the Excess Defence Articles (EDA) pro-
gramme.35 At the same time, Malaysia’s defence minis-
try signed a contract for 54 armoured infantry vehi-
cles with the Malaysian company Deftech, for delivery 
by 2020.36 In the past few years, Malaysia has also 
ordered six French frigates (with delivery starting in 
2019) and six South Korean frigates. Three of the latter 
should be produced in Malaysia. Delivery of the re-
maining three is scheduled for 2018. The French frig-
ates are to be equipped with one Swedish ship gun 
each; the contract with the Swedish government was 
signed in 2014. Here too, at least a part of the manu-
facturing process is meant to take place in Malaysia. 
To equip its new frigates, Kuala Lumpur has addition-
ally ordered 100 NSM anti-ship missiles from Norway. 
The Malaysian air force has also made a series of 
new acquisitions recently. For example, it bought five 
PC-7 Turbo Trainer planes from Switzerland and, inter 
alia, 20 Sidewinder guided missiles and six helicopters 
from the US. The planned purchase of new fighter jets 
as a medium-term replacement for the outdated Rus-
sian MiG-29s that Malaysia bought in the 1990s has so 
far not been realised.37 The majority of recent arms 
 
34 Jason Ng and Trefor Moss, “Malaysia Toughens Stance 
with Beijing over South China Sea”, Wall Street Journal, 8 June 
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spending by the air force went on four Spanish A400M 
Atlas transport planes with German-built engines, 
bought in 2014. Given the Sabah invasion of 2013, the 
strategic aim associated with this deal is likely to be 
much more rapid future troop deployment from cen-
tral Malaysia to Borneo.38 
To date, Malaysia’s slowing economic growth and 
domestic political crisis have prevented any further 
significant arms purchases. According to statements 
by the Malaysian Admiralty, even once the new frig-
ates have entered service, it will not be capable of 
adequately controlling and securing the country’s vast 
territorial waters. This, it said, would require a fleet 
of at least 20 frigates, of which six or seven could then 
be permanently deployed in Malaysia’s territorial 
waters.39 Moreover, the majority of Malaysia’s navy 
vessels have been in service for 25 years or more and 
will have to be replaced with more recent ships in the 
near future.40 The country’s air force presents a simi-
lar picture. Here, too, the arms modernisation that is 
indispensable from a military perspective has largely 
failed to materialise because of shrinking budgets. 
Myanmar 
In 2015 Myanmar spent $3.1 billion on its armed 
forces, almost 4 percent of its GDP. Even though that 
year’s defence budget was somewhat smaller than in 
previous years, Myanmar, one of the poorest countries 
in Asia, clearly funds its military extremely generous-
ly. An estimated 20 percent of the national budget is 
spent on the military (Tatmadaw), which managed to 
give itself far-reaching political influence in the con-
stitution as part of the country’s political transition, 
initiated in 2014. It has also removed itself almost 
entirely from civilian oversight. Alongside the budget 
provided by the state, the Tatmadaw also receive 
income from a large number of military companies 
and foundations, meaning that the official defence 
budget only partly reflects the effective budget of the 
military. 
Since its independence from the UK in 1948 under 
the name of Burma, the ethnically extremely diverse 
country has focused its security policy on protecting 
its territorial integrity and stability from centrifugal 
 
38 IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (see note 25), 213. 
39 Chang, “Comparative Southeast Asian Military Moderni-
zation – I” (see note 37). 
40 Goldrick and McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia (see note 
17), 116. 
forces in the outer provinces. These consist of over a 
dozen, mostly ethnic, militant groups, the smallest of 
which only have a few hundred armed fighters, the 
biggest up to 30,000. Despite the ceasefires concluded 
with several of these ethnic rebel movements in the 
past few years, the central government continues to 
face a series of violent conflicts with numerous armed 
groups. The majority of the arms that Myanmar’s 
leadership has recently bought are therefore intended 
to improve the military’s capacities in counter-insur-
gency. An arms embargo currently prevents EU mem-
ber states from exporting arms to Myanmar. For that 
reason among others, Myanmar has mainly obtained 
its armaments from Russia and China throughout the 
last decade. In recent years, Myanmar has thus im-
ported 100 armoured vehicles for its army from China, 
and S-125 ground-to-air missiles from Russia. For its 
air force, it has bought 50 Karakorum-8 light attack 
aircraft from China and 20 G-120TP unarmed training 
aircraft from Germany. The latter, however, will not 
be delivered until later this year. In addition, the 
Burmese air force has obtained ten used Russian heli-
copters, which will be extensively overhauled and 
modernised in Russia. It has bought aircraft engines 
in Ukraine and radar devices in India.  
In general, the military’s almost exclusive focus on 
counter-insurgency inside the country has continued 
to limit the acquisition of new conventional weapons 
systems in recent years. Air force arms purchases 
worth mentioning include fighter aircraft: 16 JF-17-
Thunder jets from Pakistan (2015) and 20 MiG-29s 
from Russia (2011-2013). For its navy, Myanmar has 
bought two Chinese 053H1 frigates and up to six Aung 
Zeya-class frigates, to be designed by China but manu-
factured and equipped with guided missiles in Myan-
mar. In addition, six Israeli patrol boats have been 
acquired for the Burmese navy, which was also nego-
tiating for a delivery of Indonesian landing craft with 
the Indonesian arms manufacturer PAL Indonesia in 
2014. The outcome of these talks is not yet known. 
During the period covered by this study, the one-sided 
orientation of the Tatmadaw, towards domestic coun-
ter-insurgency, has barely changed, meaning that the 
majority of its new military purchases are not out-
ward-looking or offensive in nature. 
The Philippines 
The military spending of the Philippines was $3.89 
billion in 2015. In absolute terms, that is about two-
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thirds higher than in 2005 (2005: $2.5 bn). However, as 
a proportion of GDP, the defence budget has remained 
constant at 1.3 percent due to strong economic growth 
rates over the last few years. 
Compared to the rest of the region, the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are extremely ill-
equipped with conventional weapons. According to 
observers, large parts of the air force and especially of 
the navy are totally outdated or not even deployable in 
case of emergency.41 For example, the only purchase 
for the navy between 1995 and 2005 was of four 
British Peacock-class corvettes. In 2005 the air force 
decommissioned its last fighter jet.42 There are two 
main reasons for the current state of the Philippines 
armed forces. First, successive governments in Manila 
relied for decades on the military alliance concluded 
with the US in the 1950s, and thus on Washington as 
an external guarantor of its security. Second, for a 
long time the security policy of the Philippines was 
almost exclusively focused on internal security threats 
(Maoist and separatist armed movements, inter alia). 
However, increasingly frequent confrontations in the 
South China Sea between China’s navy and coast guard 
and its own have led Manila to rethink its security 
outlook and associated strategy. This has also brought 
about changes to its arms dynamic. The Republic Act 
(RA) 10349, passed in 2013 and also known as the 
Revised AFP Modernisation Programme, provides for a 
step-by-step increase of the defence budget until 2018. 
Enhanced arms purchases are intended to give the AFP 
a “minimum credible defence status”. The programme 
was initiated because of the assessment, shared by the 
then-Aquino government and large parts of the con-
gress, that the AFP was not in a position to defend the 
nation’s borders effectively in case of an external 
threat to the country’s territorial sovereignty.43 
The main purchases for the Philippines army in 
recent years, however, have been armoured infantry 
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vehicles. Manila bought 28 second hand vehicles from 
Israel; a further 111, also used, were shipped by the US 
in 2015 as part of its military aid. To date, the only 
significant armaments purchase made by the Philip-
pines government under the Revised AFP Modernisa-
tion Programme is of three used Hamilton-class coast 
guard vessels from the US. A fourth boat of the same 
class will be delivered in 2017.44 In addition, in 2015 
Manila acquired two Balikpapan landing-craft from 
Australia, which had been decommissioned by the 
Australian navy three years earlier. The landing-craft 
were a donation from the Australian government, 
intended to improve the capabilities of the Philippines 
navy in amphibian transport and disaster relief. In 
2016 Manila bought another three used landing-craft 
of the same type from the Australian navy. Three Indo-
nesian-built Makassar landing-craft were scheduled for 
delivery in late 2016.  
In recent years, the coast guard of the Philippines 
has benefited from more extensive new acquisitions. 
In 2015 Manila obtained ten patrol boats straight from 
the factory in Japan, to be used for long-distance de-
ployments. Previously the coast guard had only had 
nine such patrol boats, only seven of which were even 
usable.45 In 2016 it received two more patrol boats of 
this type from Japan, which is the country’s greatest 
donor of development aid and has declared its inten-
tion of leasing surveillance aircraft to the Philippines 
coast guard.46 In September 2016 a call for tender by 
the Philippines defence ministry for two new frigates, 
dating back to 2013, was concluded. The candidate 
chosen for the order worth $337 million was the 
South Korean manufacturer Hyundai Heavy Industries 
(HHI). An exact delivery date has not yet been an-
nounced.47  
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The air force of the Philippines has been upgraded 
inter alia through the purchase of twelve FA-50 fighter 
jets from South Korea. Ten have already been deliv-
ered; the remaining two are scheduled for late 2017. 
The air force will obtain the EL/M-2032 pulse-Doppler 
radars for the FA-50s from Israel. A number of other 
recent armaments purchases for the air force have 
been based on decisions taken prior to the Revised AFP 
Modernisation Programme and the associated re-
orientation of the armed forces towards defending the 
nation’s external borders. Correspondingly, these pur-
chases were still made primarily to improve the ability 
of the Philippines to engage in military counter-insur-
gency within its borders. Thus in 2015 France delivered 
four AS-550 Fennec light attack helicopters, and Italy 
ten A-109K light attack helicopters. The Philippines 
government has also recently acquired seven military 
transport planes: three C-295s from Spain (whose 
engines were imported from Canada), and in 2015 two 
C-212s from Indonesia and two used C-130H Hercules 
from the US. Washington also sold the Philippines 
eight Bell-412 attack helicopters. Plans to erect an 
Israeli-built coastal rocket complex on the island of 
Palawan were put on ice in 2015 by Manila’s defence 
ministry. The allocated sums were rededicated to 
buying military equipment for counter-insurgency 
instead.48 
In 2016 the Philippines congress authorised the 
purchase of two frigates, three attack helicopters 
equipped with anti-submarine missiles, and six close-
air-support planes, for a total price of $10.8 million.49 
Two of the three anti-submarine helicopters were 
ordered in March from the Italian manufacturer Fin-
meccanica (since renamed Leonardo). They are due to 
be delivered in 2018.50 Congress also agreed in August 
2016 to increase the defence budget by 15 percent for 
2017.51 
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In general, it should be noted that Benigno Aquino’s 
government, which was in office from 2010 to 2016, 
pushed ahead with modernising parts of the armed 
forces, especially the navy and air force. Whilst not all 
the intended modernisation targets were reached – be-
cause of budget squeezes, among other reasons – arms 
spending nonetheless rose sharply. This has been ac-
companied by a gradual reorientation of the armed 
forces away from counter-insurgency and towards 
securing the nation’s borders. On the material level, 
this has brought about several changes. For example, 
following the purchase of FA 50 light fighter aircraft, 
the Philippines now have such aircraft in their arsenal 
for the first time since 2005. By regional standards, 
however, these developments remain very modest, 
both in terms of the quantity and the quality of the 
weapons systems. Even if the target set by the Aquino 
government of a “minimum credible defence” is 
achieved in the coming years, the Philippines will still 
not have any weapons systems at its disposal (such as 
anti-ship missiles) that could decisively obstruct or 
even prevent an enemy force from entering the coun-
try’s territorial waters in case of an armed confronta-
tion.52 Moreover, President Rodrigo Duterte, who was 
re-elected in late 2016, has set a much more China-
friendly course in foreign policy than the previous 
government, and has also announced that defence 
policy will once again focus more on combating in-
ternal security threats.  
Singapore 
In 2015 the island and city state of Singapore spent 
the lordly sum of $1,024 billion on its armed forces. 
Since 2005 it has thus increased its military spending 
by about ten percent in absolute terms. However, as a 
proportion of GDP, the 2015 defence budget repre-
sents only 3.2 percent, a significant drop compared to 
2005 (4.3 percent of GDP). Since independence in 1965, 
Singapore – a city state with no strategic depth – has 
based its security policy on the military deterrence of 
potential invaders by a well-trained military, heavily 
 
52 Shang-su Wu, “Aquino’s Military Modernization: Unprece-
dented but Insufficient”, The Diplomat (online), 23 March 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/aquinos-military-
modernization-unprecedented-but-insufficient/ (accessed 
16 January 2017). 
Singapore 
SWP Berlin 
An Arms Race in Southeast Asia? 
August 2017 
 
 
 
17 
armed with state-of-the-art technologies.53 To this end, 
it gives itself one of the highest military budgets in the 
world per head of population. On average a quarter of 
the national budget goes on defence, making the coun-
try one of the globe’s largest arms importers. In ab-
solute terms, the military budget of this city state with 
its five million inhabitants is larger than that of its 
immediate neighbour Indonesia (population: 240 mil-
lion). Singapore also has more submarines, war planes 
and battle tanks than many of its much bigger neigh-
bours. To avoid being regarded as a potential military 
threat by its neighbours, which might in turn upset 
the balance of power in the region, Singapore pursues 
a doctrine of “strategic restraint” and largely forgoes 
buying offensive weapons systems.54 The Singaporean 
leadership’s security policy continues to be strongly 
influenced by the Lion City’s relations with its larger 
neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia, which have not 
always been smooth sailing, and increasingly also by 
China’s more aggressive behaviour in the region. How-
ever, non-traditional security risks have also become a 
focus recently. In particular, security in the Malacca 
Straits, which are crucial for Singapore’s sea trade, has 
gained greatly in importance.55 
A large share of the constantly very high military 
spending of the past few years has thus gone on the 
navy. It has bought 120 French MICA missiles to be 
installed on eight new Singapore-built corvettes of the 
Independence class as well as the associated radar 
systems. The ships’ engines were bought in Germany, 
their 76mm guns in Italy, and their air/sea search 
radar in the Netherlands. The eight new corvettes are 
intended to replace the old patrol boats currently be-
ing used by the Singaporean navy.56 In 2013 Singapore 
also agreed a deal with Germany for two type 218 sub-
marines, to be delivered as of 2020. For its army, the 
government has recently bought 200 Aster medium-
range anti-aircraft missiles from France. These are 
 
53 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singa-
pore (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000); See Seng Tan, “Mailed 
Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to 
Singapore’s Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 332–58, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/01402390.2014.1002909 (accessed 16 January 2017). 
54 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulner-
ability (London: Routledge, 2000). 
55 Lee Li Huat, “Will Strengthening the SAF Mean Strength-
ening Singapore’s Deterrence as a Non-Nuclear State?”, Pointer 
– Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 41, no. 4 (2015): 21–32, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/documents/pdf/ 
V41N4_strengtheningthesaf.pdf (accessed 17 January 2016). 
56 IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (see note 25), 213. 
used to equip mobile SAMP/T batteries. It has also 
bought 13 used battle tanks from Switzerland. 
The air force most recently acquired six Spanish-
made A-330 tanker aircraft. It has also imported 200 
AIM-120C air-to-air missiles, two Seahawk helicopters, 
20 Sidewinder guided missiles and 88 GMLRS rockets 
with cluster ammunition from the US.57 Singapore’s 
defence ministry also announced in mid-2015 that its 
existing squadron of F-16 fighter jets would be armed 
with new AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) 
radar systems, giving them improved precision attack 
capabilities.58 In 2014 Singapore had stated its interest 
in buying twelve latest-model F35B fighter jets from 
the US. However, it put these plans on ice in August 
2016 arguing that its aircraft fleet, upgraded in the 
past few years with the addition of new F-16 and F-15 
fighter jets, was currently adequate for the country’s 
aerial defence.59 
According to Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen, Singa-
pore’s current armament policy generally concen-
trates more on replacing outdated weapons systems 
than on acquiring entirely new ones.60 For instance, as 
mentioned above, its Fearless-class patrol boats are 
scheduled to be replaced in the coming years by eight 
new vessels built in Singapore itself. As of 2015 its 
V200 armoured personnel carriers, built in the 1970s, 
are likewise being replaced by new Peacekeeper Pro-
tected Response Vehicle, manufactured in Singapore.61 
All the air force’s Super Puma helicopters are also 
slated for replacement over the coming decade. Singa-
pore is one of the few countries in the region that has 
an arms industry of sufficient size to produce howit-
zers, battleships, infantry vehicles and assault rifle, 
among other armaments, for the national and inter-
 
57 All data taken from “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
1988–2015” (see note 10). 
58 IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (see note 25), 213. 
59 Anthony Capaccio, “Singapore Puts off Decision on 
Whether to Buy Lockheed’s F-35”, Bloomberg (online), 9 August 
2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-08/ 
singapore-puts-off-decision-on-whether-to-buy-lockheed-s-f-35 
(accessed 16 January 2017). 
60 Singapore Government, Ministry of Defence, “Speech by 
Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, at Committee of Supply 
Debate 2015”, Mindef Singapore (online), 6 March 2015, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_ 
releases/sp/2015/05mar15_speech.html#.V_ZGQ3r2myp 
(accessed 16 January 2017). 
61 Rei Kurohi, “New Armoured Vehicle to Keep S’pore Safe”, 
The Straits Times, 9 July 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/ 
singapore/new-armoured-vehicle-to-keep-spore-safe (accessed 
16 January 2017). 
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national market.62 Part of its defence spending thus 
goes to its own military-industrial complex, which in 
turn presently provides a substantial proportion of the 
armaments for the Singapore Armed Forces. 
Thailand 
In 2015 Thailand’s military budget was $6.1 billion, 
nearly double its 2005 budget in absolute terms. The 
2015 military expenditure represents 1.6 percent of 
GDP, a significant increase on 2005 (1.1 percent of 
GDP). Thailand has been repeatedly shaken by domes-
tic political crises for over a decade. On two separate 
occasions during the period covered by this study, in 
2007 and again in 2014, the military carried out a 
successful putsch, arguing both times that it had to 
restore peace and stability in the country in the face of 
the violent clashes between supporters of the govern-
ment and the opposition. After each putsch, Thai-
land’s military budget was raised massively, and its 
generals went on extended shopping sprees.63 More-
over, 2004 saw the escalation of a conflict that had 
been smouldering for decades between the central 
government and armed rebel groups in the country’s 
three majority-Muslim southern provinces, bordering 
on Malaysia. Negotiations between the military and 
the armed groups have so far proved fruitless. 
In the past few years, Thailand has bought six 
Israeli-built ATMOS-2000-155mm howitzers for its land 
forces. It has also purchased 121 BTR-3U Guardian 
armoured infantry vehicles, 1,500 anti-tank missiles 
and 49 T-84 battle tanks from Ukraine. The diesel 
engines for the Ukrainian infantry vehicles were 
manufactured in Germany. Switzerland delivered 
eight GDF-35 mm anti-aircraft guns and the accompa-
nying radar systems, and the US nine ground-to-air 
missiles as well as Cummins-6V diesel engines for the 
First Win armoured infantry vehicles, built in Thai-
land itself. Manila also bought Starstreak ground-to-air 
missiles from the UK, which will be delivered in 2017. 
In January 2016 the German arms manufacturer 
 
62 John Dowdy et al., Southeast Asia: The Next Growth Opportunity 
in Defense (Singapore: McKinsey Innovation Campus, Aero-
space and Defense Practice, February 2014), 10. 
63 Paul Chambers, Civil-Military Relations in Thailand since the 
2014 Coup. The Tragedy of Security Sector “Deform”, PRIF Report 
no. 138 (Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konflikt-
forschung, 2015), http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/ 
hsfk_publikationen/prif138.pdf (accessed 16 January 2017). 
Rheinmetall received an order from the Thai govern-
ment for four Oerlikon-Skyguard-3 anti-aircraft guns.64 
For its air force, Thailand acquired six EC145 light 
helicopters in 2015 and another five in 2016, from 
Germany. From Russia it bought two transport heli-
copters. France also delivered transport helicopters in 
2015 (four EC725 Super Cougars); another two are 
scheduled for delivery in 2017. In October 2016 Bang-
kok ordered yet another two EC725 helicopters from 
Airbus, to be delivered in 2019.65 Italy sold Thailand a 
P-180-Avanti transport aircraft and eight AW139 heli-
copters; South Korea four T-50-Golden Eagle trainer 
planes; the US three Black Hawk attack helicopters 
and 50 AIM-120C air-to-air guided missiles. Bangkok 
also modernised its existing arsenal of F-16 fighter jets 
with new APG-68 radar systems made in the US.  
The Thai navy was upgraded by two South Korean 
DW-3000 frigates and a 90-metre-long BVT-90 long-dis-
tance patrol boat built in the UK. The boat’s 76mm 
gun was also ordered from the UK; the radar system 
from the Netherlands; the anti-submarine sonar de-
vices for the two South Korean frigates from Germany. 
To modernise its existing arsenal, Bangkok also 
ordered new radar systems from Sweden. According 
to reports, the 2017 defence budget for the first time 
contains funds for purchasing up to three Chinese 
submarines.66 It would appear that Thailand’s plans to 
acquire a submarine fleet, first mooted in the 1990s, 
are now being realised.67 
The Thai military junta has also announced how it 
intends to expand the national arms industry. Domes-
tic producers of military goods, who so far have led a 
rather pitiful, marginal existence, are from now on 
supposed to be integrated more closely into the 
national security strategy via government contracts 
and partnerships with foreign firms. In 2015 the Thai 
shipyard Marsun launched the first ever patrol boat 
entirely built in the country. If the trials begun in mid-
 
64 C. H. Fong, “Last Line of Air Defence”, Asian Defence Journal, 
(January–February 2016): 18. 
65 Gareth Jennings, “Thailand Adds to EC725 Orders”, IHS 
Jane’s 360, 4 October 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/ 
64312/thailand-adds-to-ec725-orders (accessed 16 January 
2017). 
66 “Junta-ruled Thailand Says It Will Buy Three Chinese 
Submarines”, Reuters (online), 1 July 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-china-
idUSKCN0ZH4V4 (accessed 16 January 2017). 
67 John Grevatt, “Thailand Includes Submarine Funding in 
2017 Budget”, IHS Jane’s 360, 14 September 2016, 
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Vietnam 
SWP Berlin 
An Arms Race in Southeast Asia? 
August 2017 
 
 
 
19 
2016 are successful, the M58 Laemsing will be sold to 
the Thai navy.68 
However, the extended shopping sprees that Thai-
land’s generals have enjoyed in the past few years 
might be markedly reduced in 2017. The 2017 defence 
budget, published recently, only provides for a modest 
raise of 2 percent on 2016, in contrast with previous 
years: after the 2014 putsch, the military budget was 
increased by 5 percent (2015) and 7 percent (2016). The 
budget for 2017 represents a 7 percent share of the 
national budget and 1.5 percent of GDP. The defence 
budget reduction can be directly linked to the coun-
try’s dwindling economic growth after the military 
putsch of 2014. Thailand, Southeast Asia’s second-
biggest economy, only registered 3.5 percent growth 
in 2016, falling markedly behind its neighbours in the 
region. Moreover, direct foreign investment has col-
lapsed by almost 90 percent.69 
Vietnam  
In 2015 Vietnam spent $4.5 billion on its armed forces. 
This represents an increase in absolute terms of more 
than 200 percent since 2005. The 2015 defence budget 
equals 2.3 percent of GDP, a marked increase on 2005 
(1.8 percent of GDP). Until the mid-2000s, Vietnam 
primarily owned outdated military equipment from 
Soviet stock. However, against the backdrop of the 
steadily rising tensions with China in the South China 
Sea over the past decade, Hanoi has made extensive 
changes to its arms policy. In 2007 the country’s Com-
munist Party (CP) passed a resolution to design a new 
national Maritime Strategy 2020, and in 2009 pub-
lished a new defence White Paper. Both documents 
emphasised that the country’s maritime sovereignty 
must be better protected against external threats and 
that this required upgrading its armaments. Since 
then, the Vietnamese armed forces have gone on a 
spending spree. 
 
68 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Thailand’s First M58 Patrol Boat Com-
pletes Sea Trials in Preparation for Delivery”, IHS Jane’s 360, 
26 August 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/63267/ 
thailand-s-first-m58-patrol-boat-completes-sea-trials-in-
preparation-for-delivery (accessed 16 January 2017). 
69 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth about Thailand’s 
2017 Defense Budget ‘Hike’”, The Diplomat (online), 10 Sep-
tember 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-truth-
about-thailands-2017-defense-budget-hike/ (accessed 16 
January 2017). 
For its army, Hanoi bought 20 mobile Extended 
Range Artillery missile systems (EXTRA) from Israel, 
which are specially designed for defending coastal 
facilities and ports. According to press reports, several 
of these systems were installed on islands occupied by 
Vietnam belonging to the disputed Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea. Given the range and high preci-
sion of these missiles, observers believe they would 
enable Vietnam to strike the South China Sea reefs 
that China has consolidated and expanded to make 
artificial islands, and equipped with ports, military 
installations and runways. However, the Vietnamese 
government has consistently denied stationing mis-
siles on the Spratly Islands.70 Incidentally, it has also 
bought three Russian Pechora-2T mobile ground-to-air 
missile delivery systems. 
Vietnam’s navy and air force have profited even 
more from the changed arms dynamic of the past few 
years than its army. In 2013 the air force ordered 
twelve new Russian Su-30MK2 fighter jets and three 
Spanish C-295 transport aircraft. three years earlier, in 
2010, it had already ordered 20 Russian Su-30MK3 
fighter jets, whose engines come from Canada, and 
four VERA-E radars from the Czech Republic, which 
can identify and follow flying targets even if they have 
stealth characteristics.  
However, the most extensive new acquisitions of 
recent years concern the navy. The purchase of six 
Russian Kilo-class submarines – equipped among other 
things with SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles, SS-N-30 cruise 
missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes – triggered an 
intense debate among observers. The final submarine 
was delivered in January 2017.71 The navy’s armoury 
was also expanded by ten new Russian Tarantul Mol-
niya corvettes, armed with missiles. Vietnam obtained 
the necessary turbines from Ukraine. Hanoi also pur-
chased four new frigates (two each from Russia and 
the Netherlands), none of which has been delivered 
yet. The two Gepard 3 frigates from Russia are pro-
visionally scheduled to be delivered in 2017, and are 
likewise equipped with SS-N-30 missiles.72 The com-
 
70 Greg Torode, “Exclusive: Vietnam Moves New Rocket 
Launchers into Disputed South China Sea – Sources”, Reuters 
(online), 10 August 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
southchinasea-vietnam-exclusive-idUSKCN10K2NE (accessed 
16 January 2017). 
71 “HQ-187 Ba Ria – Vung Tau Submarine Undergoes Test in 
the Finland Gulf”, Defense Studies (online), 13 September 2016, 
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/2016/09/hq-187-ba-ria-
vung-tau-bay-submarine.html (accessed 16 January 2017). 
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pletion date for the two SIGMA-90 Dutch frigates, one 
of which is slated to be built in Vietnam, has not yet 
been made public. To arm the Dutch frigates, Hanoi 
also bought 40 French MICA missiles, 25 French MM-
40-3-Exocet anti-ship missiles and Italian-made radar 
systems and Super Rapid 76mm guns. For its Russian-
made frigates, Vietnam has ordered 400 SS-N-25 anti-
ship rockets. The government has also announced 
plans to develop its national arms industry, especially 
in the naval sector, relying on a technology and know-
ledge transfer with Russian companies to do so. 
Other purchases have benefited the coast guard. In 
2013 Vietnam obtained three overhauled used patrol 
boats from South Korea. As part of the 2011 Defence 
Cooperation Agreement concluded between Japan and 
Vietnam, six overhauled Japanese coast guard vessels 
passed into Vietnamese possession in 2015. In 2014 
Hanoi announced plans to buy 32 new ships for its 
coast guard in the coming years for a total cost of 
$547 million.73 Since the US arms embargo was lifted 
in May 2016, Hanoi has also focused on purchasing 
arms from Washington. Observers believe that in the 
near future Vietnam is likely to try and acquire 
decommissioned P-3C-Orion aircraft from US stocks; 
they are particularly well-suited for maritime surveil-
lance and anti-submarine warfare.74 
Additionally, the Vietnamese government is hold-
ing talks with European arms manufacturers about 
purchasing fighter jets, naval aircraft and drones 
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAV).75  
Overall, the changes in Vietnam’s arms dynamic 
can therefore be described as dramatic. The total cost 
of the new submarines and twelve Su-30MK2 fighter 
jets ordered last year is almost $3 bn – nearly the 
entire defence budget for 2014. The budget of the navy 
alone has more than doubled in the past eight years. 
Observers’ attention has also been caught by the 
hurried nature of the purchase and the rapid delivery 
of many armaments. The last of the six Russian sub-
marines ordered in 2009 was delivered in early 2017. 
The last two machines of the new Su-30MK fighter jet 
squadron were delivered to Vietnam in February 2016, 
less than three years after being ordered. Hanoi has 
thus doubled the size of its fighter-aircraft fleet. With-
in a decade, its huge arms purchases have put Viet-
 
73 Vu Trong Khanh, “Japan to Help Vietnam Improve Mari-
time Capability”, Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-to-help-vietnam-improve-
maritime-capability-1406883961 (accessed 16 January 2017). 
74 IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (see note 25), 207. 
75 Ibid., 212. 
nam in a position to pursue an asymmetrical Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against external 
aggressors. Its recent arms purchases would make it 
very risky for enemy forces to enter waters claimed by 
Vietnam since they must expect to be met by mobile 
missile systems, submarines and fighter jets equipped 
with anti-ship missiles. 
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The Role of European Arms Exporters 
 
European arms firms have a large share in Southeast 
Asia’s arms upgrades – a fact that has so far not been 
discussed in the region or in Europe. It is nonetheless 
well-known that European manufacturers play an 
important role on the global arms market. The five 
major European arms exporters of France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK together had a 21 percent 
share of the worldwide arms trade between 2011 and 
2015. Despite a drop over this period in both German 
and French exports of military goods (by 51 and 9.8 
percent, respectively), France and Germany are still 
the fourth and fifth-biggest global arms exporters, 
respectively. Only the US, Russia and China surpass 
them in trade volume. Over the same period, the arms 
sales of other European producers rose sharply: by 
26 percent for the UK; 55 percent for Spain; and 48 per-
cent for Italy. Asian states are important customers for 
armaments made in the EU. For example, between 
2011 and 2015, 28 percent of all French and 23 per-
cent of all German arms sales went to Asia.76 A large 
proportion of the military hardware that has been 
delivered to Southeast Asia over the past decade also 
came from Europe (see Chart 1, p. 22). 
For the eight Southeast Asian states examined in 
this study, the volume of arms imports from the EU 
has more than quintupled in absolute terms between 
2005 and 2014. From 2013 to 2014 alone, arms exports 
from EU member states to the eight states nearly 
tripled (to more than 8 bn euros in total). Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia are among the Southeast 
Asian countries receiving the most European arms ex-
ports. However, Thailand and the Philippines also pur-
chased military equipment in Europe to a notable ex-
tent in the period covered by this study. Vietnam con-
tinues to obtain the majority of its armaments from 
Russia. By contrast, EU arms exports to Cambodia have 
markedly dropped off in the past few years, and no 
lethal weapons at all have been exported to Myanmar 
since the EU arms embargo was put in place.77 
 
76 Perlo-Freeman et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 
2015 (see note 8), p. 1. 
77 European Union External Action, Annual Reports on Arms 
Exports, issues 8 (2006)–17 (2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
topics/nuclear-safety/8472/annual-reports-on-arms-exports-en 
(accessed 16 January 2017). 
In the decade from 2005 to 2015, Indonesia im-
ported armaments for a total of $4.431 billion. Of this, 
$1.832 bn – or about 41 percent – went to EU coun-
tries. In the same period, Malaysia spent $3.748 bn on 
arms, including $2.316 bn worth from the EU, a share 
of 61 percent. Thailand imported military goods worth 
$1.452 bn in total, of which $698 million (48 percent) 
went to EU states. The city state of Singapore imported 
armaments worth a total of $7.976 bn over the same 
period; $2.977 bn (37 percent) was spent in EU mem-
ber states. 
Even the Philippines, which do most of their arms 
shopping in the US, spent $95 million of the $389 mil-
lion that they used for military goods between 2005 
and 2015 in the EU – a share of 24 percent. During the 
period covered by this study, Cambodia bought the lion 
share of its new armament acquisitions from China, 
yet still spent $36 million with EU manufacturers, a 
share of 14 percent of its total volume of $252 million. 
Only Vietnam, 90 percent of whose arms expenditure 
between 2005 and 2015 (total: $4.747 bn) benefited 
Russia, spent as little as 2.5 percent, or $123 million, 
in EU member states. And Myanmar – which obtained 
almost all of its military goods (total volume: $2.347 
bn) from Russia and China, inter alia because of the EU 
arms embargo – only spent 0.85 percent ($20 million) 
of the total in the EU (see Table 5, p. 23).78 
Against a backdrop of declining arms spending in 
Western Europe and the US, Asia has emerged as a 
central market for European arms producers. It is one 
of the few regions of the world in which defence 
spending and demand for arms imports have steadily 
increased over the past few years. Some observers be-
lieve that, without these rising exports to Asia, many 
of Europe’s arms producers would have to reduce their 
current production capacities considerably. These 
companies are therefore making greater efforts to 
drum up sales in the region,79 a development that also 
results in them increasingly competing with each 
other for lucrative deals there (as well as in South and 
 
78 All data taken from “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database”, SIPRI 
(online), http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed 
5 May 2017). 
79 Dowdy et al., Southeast Asia (see note 62). 
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Chart 1 
Arms exports EU–Southeast Asia, 2005–2014 (in millions of euros) 
 
East Asia). One reason for the rising sales of EU arma-
ments to Southeast Asia is the high quality of Euro-
pean military goods. This fact is converging with 
Southeast Asian states’ growing demand for ever more 
modern and high-tech weapons systems (for instance, 
the latest submarines or radar-guided anti-ship mis-
siles), some of which are only offered by very few arms 
companies in the world in any case.80 
From 2005 to 2015, Europe’s arms manufacturers 
sold arms to each of the countries being studied – ex-
cept for Myanmar, which is subject to an EU arms 
embargo, as mentioned above.81 The majority of these 
exports came from the Big Three (Germany, France, 
UK), but a whole host of other EU states also export 
arms in significant amounts. An exhaustive listing of 
all EU armaments exports to the eight Southeast Asian 
 
80 For example, only six exporters currently divide up the 
(growing) global market for submarines between themselves: 
China, France, Germany, South Korea, Sweden and Russia. 
Japan joined the circle in 2015, but has concluded no export 
deals to date (May 2017). 
81 “Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 con-
cerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma and 
repealing Decision 2010/232/CFSP”, EUR-Lex (online), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:02013D0184-20140415&rid=1 (accessed 16 January 
2017). 
states is beyond the scope of this study.82 The (incom-
plete) list below is primarily intended to reveal current 
trends and tendencies. In the army sector, German-
built battle tanks and French-built self-propelled artil-
lery pieces were sold to Indonesia in large numbers. 
Thailand obtained diesel engines in Germany for its 
armoured infantry vehicles bought in Ukraine. In the 
air force sector, Spain exported transport aircraft to 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam. The 
Philippines also acquired British attack helicopters. 
The UK delivered portable Starstreak anti-missile 
systems to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Italian 
helicopters were sold to Thailand and the Philippines, 
German helicopters to Thailand, and French helicop-
ters to Indonesia. High-performance radar systems 
from several European sellers went to Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
However, the majority of Europe’s arms exports 
concerned the navy. France exported six frigates to 
Malaysia and two to Vietnam. The onboard artillery 
for the battleships ordered by Malaysia was manufac-
tured in Sweden. Indonesia also ordered two Dutch-
built frigates and obtained the associated anti-ship
 
82 See also the SIPRI documentation, the EU Annual Reports on 
Arms Exports (see note 77) and the national arms export 
reports of the individual EU states. 
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Table 5 
Share of EU member states in Southeast Asian arms imports 
(in millions of US dollars and at constant 1990 prices) 
 Arms imports (total) 
2005–2015  
(in millions of  US$) 
Of which from EU 
member states  
(in millions of  US$) 
Of which from 
EU states 
(percentage) 
Cambodia  252  36  14% 
Indonesia  4,431  1,832  41% 
Malaysia  3,748  2,316  61% 
Myanmar  2,347  20  0.85% 
Philippines  389  95  24% 
Singapore  7,976  2,977  37% 
Thailand   1,452  698  48% 
Vietnam  4,747  123  2.5% 
Source: “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database”, SIPRI (online),  
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed 5 May 2017). 
 
missiles in France, which also delivered the anti-ship 
missiles for the corvettes made in Singapore itself. The 
corvettes’ diesel engines in turn were built in Ger-
many, and their artillery systems in Italy. Germany 
and Sweden also sold Thailand radar systems for 
frigates produced in South Korea. Singapore ordered 
two submarines from Germany.  
Many of the recent armament deals between Euro-
pean arms firms and Southeast Asian customers also 
include transfer-of-technology agreements (ToT), some 
of them extensive. The deal to relocate part of the 
Dutch-frigate production to Indonesia and have 
Indonesian armament companies participate in the 
manufacture also boosts the transfer of technology 
and knowledge to the region. This should make the 
destination countries more autonomous in their arms 
policy in the long run; however, the process will be 
time-intensive and resource-intensive. Furthermore, 
the Southeast Asian countries have primarily licensed 
foreign-made weapons systems rather than building 
their own. It should therefore be assumed that arms 
imports will continue to play the principal role in 
enhancing the region’s military capacities in the short 
and medium term.83 
Based on the available empirical material, we can 
assume that a number of European states have direct-
ly contributed to the changing arms dynamic in 
 
83 Giacomo Persi Paoli and Elli Kytomaki, Towards a Universal 
Arms Trade Treaty – Understanding Barriers and Challenges in South-
East Asia (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016), 9, http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/research_reports/RR1779.html (accessed 16 January 
2017). 
Southeast Asia through weapons exports. The growing 
demand for maritime armaments, especially in the 
littoral states of the South China Sea, has been ser-
viced by European countries among others. Europe’s 
direct involvement in the military upgrading of the 
region challenges the widespread view in both Europe 
and Southeast Asia that the old continent plays no 
part in Southeast Asia’s “hard” (i.e. military) security 
policy.84 As a matter of fact, a variety of European-
made corvettes, frigates and submarines plough the 
waters of Southeast Asia, albeit with local crews 
aboard. 
 
 
84 Jonathan Holslag, “Europe’s Convenient Marginalisation”, 
European Voice, 5 July 2012, http://www.europeanvoice.com/ 
article/imported/europe-s-convenient-marginalisation-/ 
74781.aspx (accessed 16 January 2017); Paul Lim, “ASEAN’s 
Relations with the EU: Obstacles and Opportunities”, EU Ex-
ternal Affairs Review 2, no. 1 (2012): 46–58; Naila Maier-Knapp, 
“The European Union as a Normative Actor and Its External 
Relations with Southeast Asia”, Journal of Contemporary Euro-
pean Research 10, no. 2 (Mai 2014): 221–35; Lay Hwee Yeo, “Can 
the EU Be a Serious Security Actor in Asia?”, Asia Europe Journal 
11, no. 4 (December 2013): 465–67. 
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In general, it should be noted that the overall regional 
trend towards rising defence spending exists in all 
eight of the examined states as well – albeit in varying 
shapes and dynamics and with different outcomes. 
However, this analysis has also shown that there is 
currently no arms race in Southeast Asia in the classi-
cal sense. There is neither a lasting extensive antago-
nism between two or more states in the region, nor 
does each state upgrade militarily in anticipation of, 
or in reaction to, the changes made by other coun-
tries. It is certainly the case – in particular in Vietnam, 
Indonesia and the Philippines (under the Aquino 
government) – that a major cause of states’ efforts to 
upgrade their military is their growing concern about 
China’s increasingly aggressive stance as a threat to 
their own territorial claims, as well as the strategic 
uncertainty that this creates. However, these efforts 
are not in any way intended to gain parity with China 
or change the military balance of power with Beijing 
decisively to their own advantage. The former presi-
dent of the Philippines, Aquino, described the idea of 
entering into an arms race with China as “idiotic”.85 
Moreover, the boom in military spending is always 
also determined by the extent of internal security 
risks, especially in the shape of militant secessionist or 
Jihadist groups. This is the case for the Philippines and 
Indonesia, for instance, but also for Thailand and 
Myanmar. Besides, military upgrading in Southeast 
Asia is not characterised by very rapid quantitative or 
qualitative leaps – the majority of arms purchases is 
primarily used to modernise outdated equipment and 
has therefore not led to any notable quantitative 
increase in conventional weapons capacity. Nor has it 
significantly changed the military balance of power in 
the region. Moreover, available macro-data allow for 
no direct inference on how operable the existing 
weapons systems actually are. According to some 
estimates, for instance, more than a third of the Indo-
nesian navy’s vessels are not usable at all, or only to a 
limited extent.86  
 
85 Nikko Dizon, “Aquino Takes Up Cudgels for Roxas”, Philip-
pine Daily Inquirer, 1 April 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 
777276/aquino-takes-up-cudgels-for-roxas (accessed 16 January 
2017). 
86 Schreer, Moving beyond Ambitions? (see note 27). 
However, these findings should not be taken to 
mean that armaments policy in Southeast Asia over 
the past decade has exclusively concerned itself with 
modernising outdated stock so as to maintain the 
status quo. Quite clearly, the rearmament taking place 
is competitive (albeit below the threshold of an arms 
race). Whilst this has not resulted in a dynamic of 
action and reaction, the capacities particularly of the 
navies and air forces of almost all the states studied 
have been extended. The aim of these upgrades, how-
ever, is not so much obtaining conventional military 
superiority as acquiring (often asymmetrical) military 
abilities that can be used to curtail the freedom of 
movement and strategic options of perceived oppo-
nents.  
A number of trends can be observed within the 
current arms dynamic in Southeast Asia. First, over 
the past decade the region’s states have fundamentally 
expanded their defence orientation by surmounting 
their previous, almost exclusive, focus on domestic 
counter-insurgency and concentrating more on ex-
tending their capacities to defend the nation’s borders 
instead. In many states, this development started from 
a very low level. The air force of the Philippines is a 
particularly dramatic example. In 2005 it decommis-
sioned its last fighter jet. In 2014 the government in 
Manila ordered twelve South Korean fighter jets, ten 
of which have already been delivered. 
Second, there is an equally (almost) uniform ten-
dency to pursue the armament upgrades especially in 
the navy and air force. With the exception of Cambo-
dia, all the examined states have tried over the past 
decade to modernise or even expand their navy and 
air force capacities. Particularly noticeable here is that 
many of the arms purchases in this domain are de-
signed to extend the respective state’s Anti-Access/Area 
Denial abilities and improve its control of its maritime 
territorial waters. For instance, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand among others have recently 
acquired modern submarines equipped with long-
range missiles and torpedoes. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam have additionally bought anti-
ship missiles. Examples of expanded maritime control 
and surveillance capacities are the purchases of patrol 
boats, corvettes and frigates for the coast guards of 
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Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, 
Singapore and the Philippines and of modern radar 
systems by Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and Thai-
land. 
Third, several of the countries studied are deter-
mined to expand their own arms industries. The Thai, 
Indonesian, Vietnamese and Singaporean govern-
ments have all publicly declared their intention to 
strengthen their national arms companies via govern-
ment contracts and partnerships with foreign firms. 
States such as Singapore and Indonesia already sell 
the arms produced by their own manufacturers to 
neighbouring states including the Philippines and 
Myanmar. The region’s states are also increasingly 
seeking to integrate specific agreements into arms 
deals, including with European states, amounting to a 
transfer of technology and knowledge (so-called ToT 
contracts). For instance, Indonesia regularly insists 
that significant proportions of its orders be given to 
its own arms firms – one of the three South Korean 
submarines ordered in 2012 is thus being built in 
Indonesia. 
One explanation for the changes in the region’s 
arms dynamics is the transformation of the immedi-
ate strategic environment. For a number of Southeast 
Asian states, discomfiture over China’s increasingly 
aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea – com-
bined with the uncertainty over what exactly Beijing’s 
geostrategic ambitions in East Asia might be – has 
directly influenced the decision to modernise and 
upgrade their armed forces. Simultaneously, the trust 
of Southeast Asian governments in the sustainability 
of the current regional security architecture, which is 
based on bilateral alliances between the US and in-
dividual countries in the area, has diminished. There 
are several reasons for this. First, China’s exclusion 
from the US-dominated regional security order. Bei-
jing wants to challenge the US regional dominance – 
which it views as the expression of a China-contain-
ment strategy – at least in sub-regions, such as the 
South China Sea. 
Second, Washington’s Pacific alliance partners in-
creasingly doubt the ‘authenticity’ of the US commit-
ment to its leadership role in regional security. 
According to a widespread perception in Southeast 
Asia, the US has got bogged down in its interventions 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere to such an 
extent that it is currently not willing or able to 
seriously oppose Beijing’s increasingly brash behav-
iour in the region, and above all in the South China 
Sea. In particular, states that have their own direct 
territorial confrontations with China see neither 
ASEAN – which they view as a largely dysfunctional 
regional security community – nor the US – whose 
commitment to regional leadership vis-à-vis a rising 
China they doubt – as a lasting security solution. More-
over, the new US President, Donald Trump, has openly 
questioned the future of the US-dominated regional 
security order, keeping strategic uncertainty in the 
region high. 
The countries concerned therefore present their 
military upgrading – in the words of the Vietnamese 
defence minister – as a “normal activity”: “Vietnam’s 
policy is completely for self defence and we would 
never compromise any other country’s sovereignty. 
But we must deter anyone who tries to compromise 
Vietnam’s sovereignty.”87 It does not necessarily follow 
(at all) that the states are engaged in an arms compe-
tition aimed at parity with China. Rather, the main 
reason for the trend that has been noticeable over the 
past few years of upgrading particularly the asymmet-
rical and disruptive arms categories (submarines, 
mobile anti-ship missiles, etc.) is China’s increasing 
challenge to US primacy in the Pacific and the simul-
taneous loss of trust in the sustainability of the US-
dominated regional security architecture. 
However, some of this study’s findings also point to 
the existence of intra-regional factors. For instance, 
Malaysia’s main expenditure for its air force during 
the period covered by this analysis was on acquiring 
transport aircraft. This was motivated by the incursion 
of militant groups from the Philippines into the 
Malaysian state of Sabah, in northern Borneo, in 2013. 
The military leadership in Kuala Lumpur is hoping 
that, in case of a renewed invasion, its improved trans-
port capacities now put it in a position to send troops 
much more quickly than previously to the thinly 
populated and inaccessible state of Sabah. 
In addition, there are a number of long-lasting 
territorial conflicts in the region. Besides the confron-
tation between the Philippines and Malaysia over 
northern Borneo (Sabah), Thailand and Cambodia are 
involved in a dispute over Preah Vihear temple and its 
surroundings; Indonesia and Malaysia over the Amba-
lat oil field in the Celebes Sea; and Singapore and 
Malaysia over Singaporean efforts at land reclamation 
in waters claimed by Malaysia, for example. Last but 
 
87 Quoted from “Vietnam Says Russian-bought Submarines 
for Self-defence”, Reuters, 5 June 2011, http://news.trust.org// 
item/?map=vietnam-says-russian-bought-submarines-for-self-
defence (accessed 17 January 2017). 
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not least, the Southeast Asian states’ increasing ex-
penditure on conventional arms can also be ascribed 
to their interest in boosting their respective national 
prestige compared to their neighbours through dis-
plays of military strength. For instance, the former 
president of Indonesia, Yudhoyono, repeatedly 
pointed out that the increase in his country’s military 
spending was merely to modernise outdated stocks: 
“The answer is very simple: What Indonesia has is far 
behind that which our neighbours have. We only 
intend to bridge that gap so we can maintain our 
sovereignty and peace. For 15 to 20 years, our military 
modernisation did not proceed as it should have be-
cause of economic reasons and other pressing priori-
ties”.88 However, it should be noted even with regard 
to these intra-regional factors that Southeast Asia’s 
rearmament is not a classical arms race to obtain 
broad military superiority, but a case of (often frag-
mentary) investments in selected prestige projects.  
Furthermore, alongside the external factors already 
mentioned, there are also domestic reasons behind 
the changing arms dynamics. Thailand drastically 
boosted its defence spending after the military 
putsches of 2006 and 2014, and cut state expenditure 
in other policy areas in return.89 Thailand has no 
territorial dispute with China, and its conflict with 
Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple has been 
frozen since a 2013 verdict by the International Court 
of Justice upholding Cambodia’s claims. It does not 
perceive China as a threat, and yet it has upped its 
arms imports by almost 600 percent in the past five 
years. On the contrary, Bangkok’s more recent foreign 
policy shows a rapprochement with China in response 
to US criticism of the military putsch of 2014.90 In 
other states that also do not have acute conflicts with 
their neighbour China, such as Myanmar or Cambo-
dia, defence spending in the period covered by this 
study has risen, in some sectors massively. One reason 
is a security and defence policy that focuses on inter-
nal threats. The government of Myanmar, for example, 
points to the multitude of militant groups that are 
active in the north and east of the country, where 
ethnic minorities live; Thailand’s leadership to the 
 
88 Quoted from “President Defends Jakarta’s Planned Arms 
Buy”, The Straits Times, 3 February 2012. 
89 Chambers, Civil-Military Relations in Thailand since the 2014 
Coup (see note 63). 
90 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “‘Bamboo Swirling in the Wind’: 
Thailand’s Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and the 
United States”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 2 (August 
2016): 233–57. 
armed militia in the mainly Muslim South of the 
country. At any rate, the Cambodian, Thai and Bur-
mese military already play a decidedly political role as 
guarantor of regime security (Cambodia), defender of 
the unity of the Burmese nation-state (Myanmar) and 
defender of the monarchy (Thailand), using these posi-
tions to legitimise continually rising military budgets. 
In Myanmar, which is still in a phase of transition 
from military dictatorship to democracy despite the 
free elections won by the opposition in late 2015, the 
constitution grants the armed forces far-reaching 
authority to exert political power. Important minis-
tries – such as defence, interior and border-protection 
– are headed by active military personnel. Given its 
continued strong political influence and a weak par-
liament, the Burmese military has so far managed to 
prevent any reduction of the defence budget.91 
As a consequence, the question of where military 
budgets are increased and arms purchased (and how), 
depends not only on the existence of external security 
threats, but also on the continued existence of inter-
nal ones, for example in the shape of militant Islamist 
and/or secessionist groups. Next to Thailand and Myan-
mar a further three of the eight states studied struggle 
with this kind of risk: the Philippines (MILF, MNLF, 
Abu Sayyaf and NPA, to name just a few of the militant 
groups active mainly in the south of the country); Indo-
nesia (OPM, which fights for West Papua to be granted 
independence, and a number of militant Jihadist 
groups); and Malaysia (returning IS fighters). 
These reasons, motivations and influences make it 
difficult to point to a single causal factor to explain 
the change in the arms dynamics of the eight states 
analysed. However, based on the study’s findings, they 
can be grouped into clusters with similar characteris-
tics in their stances on rearmament. During the period 
covered by this study, the fundamental (but not the 
only) reason for the substantial hike in defence spend-
ing and armaments purchases in the first cluster – con-
sisting of Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia – was 
the strategic uncertainty over what goals precisely 
China might be pursuing with its increasingly brash 
and even aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. 
The armament acquisitions of these states far exceed 
simple modernising measures, especially for their 
navies, for which certain weapons systems (e.g. sub-
marines) were either newly obtained or else massively 
 
91 Maung Aung Myoe, “The Soldier and the State: The Tatma-
daw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011”, 
South East Asia Research 22, no. 2 (June 2014): 233–49. 
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upgraded both qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
primary goal of such upgrades is to extend the states’ 
capacities to protect their territorial and maritime 
claims, and to pursue a general strategy of Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA), meaning a strategy of 
effective coastal surveillance. Admittedly, in the case 
of the Philippines, the initial level in terms of the 
quantity and quality of the respective military equip-
ment was very low indeed. By contrast, for the second 
cluster – Singapore and Malaysia – the decisive factor 
underpinning changes made to the states’ arms 
dynamics was intra-regional. Their defence spending 
barely rose in the period covered by this study, and the 
majority of their arms purchases can be ascribed to 
intra-regional rivalries and the corresponding threat 
perceptions. The two countries modernised their 
weapons systems to replace outdated arms categories 
and thus reduce disparity with other regional actors. 
They also use displays of military strength and state-of-
the-art military equipment to maintain or increase 
national prestige compared to their neighbours. The 
third cluster – Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand – 
has increased defence spending and arms purchases 
mainly for domestic political reasons: upheavals 
(putsch, transition), internal threats to national 
stability, and the strong political influence of the 
armed forces. 
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Outlook and Recommendations 
 
Based on the research findings of this study, no direct 
link can be shown to exist between the rise in arms 
purchases (or even an arms race) in Southeast Asia and 
an increased probability of violent conflict breaking 
out in the region. Conversely, this does not imply that 
the military upgrading is likely to boost stability in 
the region. On the contrary, it entails a number of 
risks for stability and security in the Pacific, for the 
following three reasons:  
First, the changing arms dynamic has contributed 
to heightened regional tensions and conflicts. These 
are based not so much on an objective increase in the 
risk of attack or war in Southeast Asia, but rather on 
growing threat perceptions, especially among the 
littoral states of the South China Sea. A number of 
them, first and foremost Vietnam, have responded to 
China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the Sea 
by upgrading their own navy and air-force capacities, 
especially in Anti-Access/Area Denial and Maritime 
Domain Awareness, for example with submarines or 
modern anti-ship missiles on mobile launch pads. The 
already heightened threat perception has been further 
raised by the fact that some of the modern far-reach-
ing conventional weapons systems that these states 
have invested in have both defensive and offensive 
features (e.g. submarines). States are responding to a 
perceived reduction of their security with rearmament 
that is often sector-specific. Against the backdrop of 
the many territorial and maritime disputes that con-
tinue to exist within ASEAN and between various 
ASEAN states and China, suspicions are also growing 
over the neighbouring states’ ‘real’ power ambitions 
and over the reliability of the regional security archi-
tecture. This conflict situation speeds up the arms 
dynamic, which in turn heightens the possibility for 
security dilemmas.92 
Second, the growing mistrust in the region is 
further heightened by the lack of regional transparen-
cy regarding changes in the national arms dynamics. 
There has certainly been an increased awareness in 
 
92 Incidentally, this also applies domestically. The upgrading 
of the national security forces, which is substantial in certain 
domains, is viewed with suspicion by armed non-state actors, 
especially in states involved in violent internal conflicts (e.g. 
Myanmar). 
Southeast Asia since the 1990s of the potentially desta-
bilising effect of a lack of transparency in arms policy. 
However, this realisation has so far largely (or only) 
manifested itself in words, not deeds. Regional organi-
sations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) or the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting have not 
yet managed to impose a greater level of transparency 
in arms procurement policy. Any agreements reached 
on the issue fall far below international standards – 
and are thus far entirely voluntary.93 The lack of politi-
cal will among the analysed Southeast Asian govern-
ments to establish a viable regional security architec-
ture, complete with working arms-control mechanisms 
and confidence-building measures, also shows in their 
international conduct. Global arms control agree-
ments such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms 
(UNROCA) or the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which 
came into effect in 2012, have been repeatedly circum-
vented by almost all the states in the region. Govern-
ments only comply with their UNROCA reporting 
obligations in a partial and irregular manner. Not one 
of the eight states under study has ratified the ATT, 
and three (Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam) have not 
even joined it (see Table 6). The primary window onto 
Southeast Asia’s arms policy is therefore the export re-
ports of the supplier states.94 However, the scope and 
quality of these reports are limited since a number of 
arms exporters – first and foremost China – publish 
barely any information on their arms exports. 
 
 
93 The agreements signed to date by ARF members include 
declarations of non-violence and non-interference; transpar-
ency measures (providing e.g. for the publication of defence 
White Papers for the purpose of exchanging information 
about national defence policies); and regional and bilateral 
meetings of defence ministers or high-ranking military dele-
gations.  
94 Irene Pavesi, Trade Update 2016: Transfers and Transparency 
(Geneva: Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of Inter-
national and Development Studies, June 2016), 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-
Update/SAS-Trade-Update.pdf (accessed 16 January 2017); see 
also the website Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, and in 
particular the remarks on “China 2015”, 
http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/china/ 
(accessed 16 January 2017). 
Outlook and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
An Arms Race in Southeast Asia? 
August 2017 
 
 
 
29 
Table 6 
Accession to UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2 April 2013 
Country ATT accession 
(yes/no) 
ATT ratification 
(yes/no) 
Cambodia yes no 
Indonesia no no 
Malaysia yes no 
Myanmar no no 
Philippines yes no 
Singapore yes no 
Thailand  yes no 
Vietnam no no 
Source: “8th Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2 April 2013”,  
United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
8&chapter=26&clang=_en (May 2017). 
Third, the very fact that the quantity and quality of 
the available weapons systems are continually being 
enhanced raises the risk of escalation. The prolifera-
tion of ever better and ever more effective military 
goods into a region that is characterised by a lack of 
transparency in arms policy and a crumbling security 
architecture has led some states to adopt risky poli-
cies. In the context of spreading nationalism, growing 
power ambitions and an increased willingness to 
assert ‘natural’ claims to resources or territories, 
clashes between security forces are becoming more 
frequent, during which neither side wants to risk 
losing face. An example is the increasing number of 
confrontations in the South China Sea. These tenden-
cies are overlaid by the strategic rivalry between the 
US and China, which also expresses itself in the two 
countries’ arms-export policies on Southeast Asia. 
Based on this study’s findings, it is safe to assume that 
the changed arms dynamic has a negative impact on 
regional security and stability. 
As one of the main arms sellers to Southeast Asian 
states, Germany should face up to the knowledge that 
there is a link between arms exports and regional 
stability. It is clear that arms exports de facto have a 
direct influence on the respective state’s military 
capacities. An increase in these capacities can lead to 
changes in the military balance of power in the region, 
which in turn can alter actors’ strategic calculations 
and military behaviour. 
The fact that German and other European arms 
firms are increasingly looking to Asia because of the 
dwindling military budgets and waning demand in 
what used to be their biggest markets should not 
tempt governments to declare arms exports into the 
region to be a commercial end in itself. Foreign and 
security-policy considerations, which have so far 
played a subordinate role, must be publicly discussed 
much more than before. Arms exports are not at all 
exclusively economic in nature. However, they con-
tinue to be primarily seen as such. This economic 
primacy, which is not accompanied by any political or 
strategic discourse on the impact of European arms 
exports to the region, is especially surprising in the 
case of exports to the littoral states of the South China 
Sea. In the past few years, Germany and other Euro-
pean states have sold armaments to various parties to 
conflicts in Southeast Asia. And yet the South China 
Sea is described by all sides as a “conflict zone” and 
“geopolitical hotspot”. This phenomenon similarly 
applies to a number of other issues in security policy, 
such as the lack of civilian oversight over the military 
or human-rights abuses by state security forces in 
almost all the states analysed in this study. However, 
there is no sustained debate on these issues either, 
whether at the German or European level. Arms export 
policies on Southeast Asia are still viewed primarily 
from an industrial and employment perspective. It 
would be more appropriate to see them first and fore-
most as an instrument of foreign and security policy.  
German and European strategy papers, whether 
general or Asia-specific, do not systematically reflect 
on the link between foreign and security policy on the 
one hand and arms-export policy on the other. It 
would be highly advisable to launch a debate on this 
connection to consider whether it is in Germany’s and 
Europe’s security interest for Southeast Asian states to 
react to, for example, China’s growing military domi-
nance by upgrading their own militaries; what the 
effects on these states’ internal security situations are 
of the total lack of civilian oversight of their armed 
forces and the simultaneous extensive impunity en-
joyed by those forces for their actions; what the con-
nection is between the region’s unsolved conflicts and 
its changed arms dynamics; and what role German 
and European exports play in this.  
There is currently a trend in Germany to link arms 
policy more closely with foreign and security policy, 
which is expected to be articulated in a new arms 
control law, inter alia. It would be desirable for this law 
to create a legal obligation to justify arms exports 
from the perspective of foreign and security policy. 
This would mean that, in future, the significance of 
any arms transfers in terms of foreign and security 
policy would be routinely assessed by a prior detailed 
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analysis of the recipient country. At present, Germa-
ny’s legislation in this domain – the foreign trade act 
and war weapons control act – does not contain any 
such criteria. The “Political principles of the German 
Federal Government for the export of weapons of war 
and other armaments” from 2000 do include guide-
lines. However, they are not legally binding. The same 
applies to the “Council Common Position 2008/944/ 
CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology 
and equipment”: it also lists criteria for the arms 
trade, but there is no legal provision either at the 
national or the European level to verify compliance.  
In this context, critical reflection is needed on the 
effects of the growing transfer of armament technolo-
gies into the region. This transfer promotes the expan-
sion of the national arms industries and is a specific 
challenge for German and European foreign and 
security policy: the use and proliferation of exported 
armaments are virtually impossible to control once 
the transfer of technology has occurred. An aggravat-
ing factor is that these exports concern a region that 
has established hardly any arms control mechanisms 
(see ATT) and that has no regional institutionalised 
confidence-building measures.95 
As one of the first signatories of the ATT, Germany 
should campaign even more strongly for its Southeast 
Asian partners to sign and ratify it as well. Whilst the 
ATT has a number of weaknesses, it is also the world’s 
first ever basis in international law for arms control. 
However, given that none of the Southeast Asian states 
analysed in this study have so far ratified the ATT 
(and Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam have not even 
signed it), and given that almost none of them ade-
quately comply with their reporting obligations, all 
strategic options should be considered in responding 
to treaty violations, including suspending arms ex-
ports. Germany could take on a pioneering role by 
tying all its arms exports to the recipient country 
joining and ratifying the ATT. In light of the results of 
the present study, this condition should also be part of 
the so-called Negative List, which is being discussed in 
connection with the new arms control law. This list 
would keep a record of states to which only limited 
arms exports are authorised, or none at all. That deci-
sion would be based on a fixed catalogue of criteria, 
which could take its bearings mainly from the Council 
 
95 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in South-
east Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000) 
Common Position, but which should also encompass 
the criterion of ATT accession and ratification.  
There has been no critical reflection at the Euro-
pean level on the link between foreign and security 
policy on the one hand and the arms exports of EU 
member states on the other. Economic factors are 
prioritised here as well – at times, individual EU mem-
ber states even compete for access to markets and 
market shares. By contrast, foreign and security policy 
are hardly taken into consideration in arms export 
issues. The European Commission’s Southeast Asia 
paper of 2015 touches on disarmament and the ATT in 
a mere half-sentence and does not even mention the 
EU’s arms exports, despite the fact that it is in the EU’s 
declared interests not to contribute to destabilising 
the region. Moreover, the criteria for European arms 
exports set out in the Common Position are inter-
preted differently by member states. For instance, 
Germany has sold over 100 Leopard battle tanks to 
Indonesia in the past few years – at around the same 
time the Dutch parliament declined Jakarta’s request 
for Leopard tanks because of the human-rights situa-
tion in the country. 
However, even tighter regulation of German and 
European arms exports cannot possibly resolve the 
causes underpinning the growing demand. Nonethe-
less it can contribute to establishing norms and sets of 
rules. After all, the growing interest of Southeast 
Asian states in importing arms is first and foremost an 
expression of inadequate conflict management and a 
regional security architecture that is dysfunctional in 
many respects. The geopolitical rivalry between China 
and the US increasingly complicates the region’s secu-
rity situation by superimposing itself on many of the 
previously bilateral conflicts. 
The EU and some of its member states have in the 
past made positive contributions to domestic and 
intergovernmental conflict management in Southeast 
Asia. Germany and the EU would therefore be well-
advised to further enhance their profile in the region 
as a potential neutral mediator and promoter of 
multilateral security structures and cooperation 
forums. 
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Abbreviations 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines 
AMRAAM Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ATT UN Arms Trade Treaty 
bn Billion 
DSA Defence Services Asia 
EDA Excess Defence Articles 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EXTRA Extended Range Artillery 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IISS The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IS Islamic State 
MEF Minimum Effective Force 
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines) 
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines) 
NPA New People’s Army (Philippines) 
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organisation for a 
Free Papua, Indonesia) 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(Solna) 
ToT Transfer of Technology 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UNROCA UN Register of Conventional Arms 
